THE AVRO CANADA CF-105 ARROW PROGRAMME: DECISIONS AND DETERMINANTS

FOOTNOTES

Chapter One:

1. Guilio Douhet, “Command of the Air,” in War, ed. Lawrence Freedman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 231, quoting Guilio Douhet, The Command of the Air, trans. Dino Ferrari, 2d ed. (New York: Coward-McCann, 1942), 16.

2. Joseph T. Jockel, Security to the North. Canada-U.S. Defense Relations in the 1990s, Canadian Series #1 (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1991), 1.

3. Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 75, quoting a remark attributed to British Prime Minister Lord Baldwin.

4. For Canadian strategic thinking during this period see John Gellner, “Problems Of Canadian Defence.” Behind The Headlines XVIII, no. 5 (September 1958): 1-19; John Gellner and James Jackson, “Modern Weapons And The Small Power,” International Journal XIII, no. 2 (Spring 1958): 87-99; Andrew Richter, The Evolution of Strategic Thinking at the Canadian Department of National Defence, 1950-1960, York Centre for International and Strategic Studies Occasional Paper Number 38, Canadian Defence and International Security Policy Special Issue Number 2 (North York: Centre for International and Strategic Studies, York University, 1996); Ronald S. Ritchie, “Problems of a Defence Policy for Canada,” International Journal XIV, no.3 (Summer 1959): 202-212; and R.J. Sutherland, “ Canada’s Long Term Strategic Situation,” International Journal XVII, no. 3 (Summer 1962): 199-223.

5. The CF-105 was officially named Arrow only in 1957, but to avoid confusion it will simply be referred to as the Arrow hereinafter, and concomitantly the Arrow programme will refer to airframe, engine, electronics system, and air-to-air missile armament.

6. Danford W. Middlemiss, “Economic Defence Co-operation with the United States 1940-1963,” in An Acceptance of Paradox: Essays on Canadian Diplomacy in Honour of John W. Holmes, ed. Kim Richard Nossal (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Internationalof Affairs, 1982), 97, also in Partners Nevertheless. Canadian-American Relations in the Twentieth Century, ed. Norman Hillmer (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1989), 167-193.

7. “The legacy of the Avro Arrow,” The Globe And Mail, 18 January 1997, A2, quoting J.L. Granatstein.

8. On the technical aspects of the Arrow programme see James C. Floyd, “The Canadian Approach to All-Weather Interceptor Development. The Fourteenth British Commonwealth Lecture,” The Journal of the Royal Aeronautical Society 62, no. 576 (December 1958): 845-866; K.M. Molson and H.A. Taylor, Canadian Aircraft since 1909 (Stittsville: Canada’s Wings, Inc., 1982); Les Wilkinson, Don Watson, Ron Page, and Richard Organ, Avro Arrow: The Story of the Avro Arrow from Its Evolution to Its Extinction (Erin: The Boston Mills Press, 1983); and Jack Woodman, “Flying The Arrow,” Canadian Aviation 51, no. 8 (August 1978): 31-37, 44.

9. Merton J. Peck and Frederic M. Scherer, The Weapons Acquisition Process: An Economic Analysis (Boston: Division of Research, Graduate School of Business, Harvard University, 1962), 3. See also Frederic M. Scherer, The Weapons Acquisition Process: Economic Incentives (Boston: Division of Research, Graduate School of Business, Harvard University, 1964).

10. Peck and Scherer, 3.

11. James R. Kurth, “Aerospace Production Lines and American Defense Spending,” in Testing the Theory of the Military-Industrial Complex, ed. Steven Rosen (Lexington: Lexington Books/D.C. Heath and Company, 1973), 135-136. Kurth is developing further arguments presented in his earlier articles “Why We Buy The Weapons We Do,” Foreign Policy no. 11 (Summer 1973): 33-56; and “A Widening Gyre: The Logic of American Weapons Procurement,” Public Policy XIX (Summer 1971): 373-404.

12. Kurth, 135.

13. Kurth, 135-136. Combinations of the four are, of course, possible, and the combination of the bureaucratic and economic explanations yields the well-known “theory of the military-industrial complex, which in its pure form argues that the military and industry are roughly equal in their influence on policy outcomes.” Kurth, 136.

14. Often also referred to as a paradigm or a conceptual framework.

15. Denis Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War, and the United States (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), 297.

16. Stairs, 297. In his last chapter, Stairs presents several analytical alternatives in recognition of the fact that many political scientists do believe that “investigations of this sort can have functional utility (as opposed to mere intrinsic interest) only to the extent that they can be made to teach lessons - that is, yield inferences which, for purposes of explanation, and even of prediction, can be translated and applied in original or amended form to similar cases elsewhere.” Stairs, 297-298.

17. D.W. Middlemiss and J.J. Sokolsky. Canadian Defence: Decisions and Determinants (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Canada Inc., 1989), 2.

18. Lawrence R. Aronsen, “Canada’s Postwar Re-armament: Another Look at American Theories of the Military-Industrial Complex, “ Historical Papers/Communications Historiques (1981): 175-196. See also Lawrence R. Aronsen, American National Security And Economic Relations With Canada, 1945-1954 (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1997); ” From World War To Limited War: Canadian-American Industrial Mobilization For Defence, Revue Internationale d’Histoire Militaire no. 51 (1982): 208-245; “‘A Leading Arsenal of Democracy:’ American Rearmament and the Continental Integration of the Canadian Aircraft Industry, 1948-1953,” The International History Review XIII, no. 3 (August 1991): 481-501; and “Planning Canada’s Economic Mobilization For War: The Origins And Operation Of The Industrial Defence Board, 1945-1951,” American Review of Canadian Studies XV, no. 1 (1985): 38-58.

19. Douglas L. Bland, The Administration Of Defence Policy In Canada 1947 to 1985 (Kingston: Ronald P. Frye & Company, Publishers, 1987), 5. See also Douglas L. Bland, Chiefs Of Defence. Government And The Unified Command Of The Canadian Armed Forces (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1995).

20. Aronsen, “Canada’s Postwar Re-armament,” 183.

21. Directorate of History and Heritage , Department of National Defence (hereinafter DHH/DND), General Charles A. Foulkes Papers (hereinafter Foulkes Papers), file 14-2 Arrow, “The Story Of The CF-105 Avro ‘Arrow,’ 1952-1962,” TD, 15; James Eayrs, The Art of the Possible. Government and Foreign Policy in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961), 99; and House of Commons, Special Committee on Defence, Minutes of Proceedings And Evidence (hereinafter Sauvé Committee), No. 15 (22 October 1963), 534. See also Bland, The Administration Of Defence Policy In Canada; Bland, Chiefs Of Defence; and Middlemiss and Sokolsky.

22. Report of the Royal Commission on Government Organization (hereinafter Glassco Commission), vol. 4, Special Areas of Administration (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1963), 72.

23. Bland, Chiefs Of Defence, 49, quoting Brooke Claxton, MND.

24. Glassco Commission, 70. The Commissioners recommended that the position be changed to a Chief of the Defence Staff having authority over the other chiefs. The recommendation was later adopted.

25. Sauvé Committee, No. 1 (27 June 1963), 191-192, quoting Major-General W.H.S. Macklin.

26. DHH/DND, Foulkes Papers, 16; Eayrs, The Art of the Possible, 99; and Sauvé Committee, No. 15 (22 October 1963), 526, 534. See also Bland, The Administration of Defence Policy In Canada; Bland, Chiefs of Defence; and Middlemiss and Sokolsky.

27. Bland, The Administration Of Defence Policy In Canada, 151

28. Michael Tucker, Canadian Foreign Policy: Contemporary Issues And Themes (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1990), 150.

29. James Eayrs, Northern Approaches. Canada And The Search For Peace (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1961), 21, quoting Air Marshal Wilfrid Curtis, “Address to the RCAF Benevolent Association of Ottawa,” Canadian Aviation 31, no. 6 (June 1958): 34-36, 96, also in “Defending the Realm: (1) “I Shot an Arrow in the Air...,”
Canadian Forum, September 1958, 1, 127-128, 144; “Back to the Drafting Board,” Canadian Forum, March 1959, 1, 288; and “Defending the Realm: (2) Memo to General Graham,” Canadian Forum, October 1958, 1, 167-168.

30. David B. Dewitt and John J. Kirton, Canada As A Principal Power. A Study In Foreign Policy And International Relations (Toronto: John Wiley & Sons Canada Limited, 1983), 201-202. George Ignatieff, a longtime foreign service officer, wrote “General Foulkes [the Chairman, CSC] told me that he wouldn’t allow External Affairs eggheads to interfere with defence policy.” George Ignatieff, The Making Of A Peacemonger. The Memoirs Of George Ignatieff (Markham: Penguin Books Canada Limited, 1987), 187.

31. Hereinafter referred to as Conservative.

32. Adrian Preston, “The Profession Of Arms In Postwar Canada, 1945-1970. Political Authority as a Military Problem,” World Politics. A Quarterly Journal of International Relations XXIII, no. 2 (January 1971): 200.

33. Preston, “The Profession Of Arms In Postwar Canada,” 201.

34. The new fighter aircraft in question was the McDonnell Douglas/Northrop F/A-18 Hornet, designated CF-188 by the Canadian Armed Forces but universally known as the CF- 18. See Kim Richard Nossal and Michael M. Atkinson, “Bureaucratic politics and the new fighter aircraft decisions,” Canadian Public Administration 24, no. 4 (Winter 1981): 529- 562. For a representative sample of the literature on the NFA decision, see also Glen Berg, “Scrambling for Dollars: Resource Allocation and the Politics of Canadian Fighter Aircraft Procurement, 1943-1983,” (MA thesis: Royal Military College, 1994); Frank L. Boyd, Jr., “The Politics of Canadian Defence Procurement: The New Fighter Aircraft Decisions,” in Canada’s Defence Industrial Base: The Political Economy of Preparedness and Procurement, ed. David G. Haglund (Kingston: R.P. Frye, 1988), 137-158; Robert M. Campbell and Leslie A. Pal, “The CF-18 Affair,” in The Real Worlds of Canadian Politics. Cases in Process and Policy, ed. Robert M. Campbell and Leslie A. Pal (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 1989), 19-52; Sister Maureen Cronin, “A Case Of Hornets: The Controversial CF-18A,” American Review of Canadian Studies 12, no. 2 (Fall 1982): 17-28; Brigadier-General P.D. Manson, “Managing the New Fighter Aircraft,” Canadian Defence Quarterly no. 7 (Spring 1978): 8-15; and Ralph Allan Shaw, “The Influence of Post-War Continental Air-Defence Strategies and National Economic Development Policies on the Industrial Organization of the Canadian Aerospace Industry,” (MA thesis, Queen’s University, 1994).

35. Atkinson and Nossal, 533.

36. Melvin Conant, The Long Polar Watch. Canada And The Defense Of North America (New York: Harper Brothers, 1962), 154. See also Melvin Conant, “Canada and Continental Defence: An American View,” International Journal XV, no. 3 (Summer 1960): 219-228.

37. Tucker, 153.

38. For the difference between “buff books” and academic tomes see James P. Stevenson, The Pentagon Paradox. The Development of the F-18 Hornet (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1993), ix-x. The Arrow “buff books” and articles vary widely in terms of quality of writing and research. For books see Palmiro Campagna, Storms Of Controversy. The Secret Avro Arrow Files Revealed, 2d ed. (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing Co. Limited, 1996); James Dow, The Arrow, 2d ed. (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, Publishers, 1997); Murray Peden, Fall of an Arrow (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing Co. Limited, 1987); E.K. Shaw, There Never Was An Arrow, 2d ed. (Ottawa: Steel Rail Educational Publishing, 1981); Fred Smye, Canadian Aviation And The Avro Arrow (Oakville: Randy Smye, 1989); Greig Stewart, Shutting Down the National Dream: A.V. Roe and the Tragedy of the Avro Arrow, 2d ed. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited,1997); and Wilkinson, Watson, Page, and Organ. For articles see Bob Bradford, “Avro’s Fallen Arrow,” Air Enthusiast no. 8 (Winter 1982): 63-73; Palmiro Campagna, “Avro Arrow. An Aviation Chapter in Canadian History.” Engineering Dimensions (September/October 1988): 46-53; Palmiro Campagna, “The Arrow, The RCAF And Canada,” in Papers Presented at the 1st Air Force Historical Conference, The Evolution of Air Power in Canada: 1916 to the Present Day and Beyond, Air Command Headquarters, Winnipeg, Manitoba, 18-19 November, 1994, vol.1, ed. William A. March and Robert H. Thompson, (Winnipeg: Department of National Defence, 1997), 100-104; James C. Floyd, “The Avro Canada Story.” Canadian Aviation 51, no. 7 (June 1978): 54-60, 126-127, 130-131; and William Mellberg, “Too Good To Be True? A Personal View of the Avro CF-105 Arrow,” Air Enthusiast no. 54 (Summer 1994): 54-57. This thesis will give more weight to the declassified government documents than to the popular literature.

39. “The legacy of the Avro Arrow,” A2.

40. Julius Lukasiewicz, “Canada’s Encounter with High-Speed Aeronautics,” Technology and Culture. The International Quarterly Journal of the Society for the History of Technology 27, no. 2 (April 1986): 252.

41. Peter C. Newman, Renegade In Power: The Diefenbaker Years (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1973), 348.

42. Denis Smith, Rogue Tory. The Life and Legend of John G. Diefenbaker (Toronto: McFarlane Walter & Ross, 1995), 634. To this list must be added dozens of World Wide Web home pages on the Internet and the highly-fictionalized 1997 Canadian Broadcasting Corporation mini-series The Arrow.

43. J.J. Brown. Ideas In Exile. A History of Canadian Invention (Toronto: McLelland and Stewart Limited, 1967), 339. As for the cancellation of the Arrow programme, Brown felt that “if a United States president had done it, he would have been impeached, and in Central Europe, he would have been shot.” Brown, Ideas In Exile, 310.

44. Shaw, There Never Was An Arrow, 1.

45. Campagna, Storms Of Controversy, 1.

46. Brown, Ideas In Exile, 311.

47. Peden, 11.

48. One noteworthy exception is historian J.L. Granatstein who has briefly but consistently attacked the widely held conventional wisdom on the Arrow programme in his many works on Canadian political history. See J.L. Granatstein, Canada 1957-1967: The Years of Uncertainty and Innovation, the Canadian Centenary Series, ed. Ramsey Cook, vol. 19 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1986); “Cooperation and Conflict: The Course of Canadian-American Relations since 1945,” in Canada and the United States: Enduring Friendship, Persistent Stress, ed. Charles F. Doran and John H. Sigler (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1985), 45-68; Norman Hillmer and J.L. Granatstein, Empire To Umpire. Canada and the World to the 1990s (Toronto: Copp Clark Longman Ltd., 1994); Norman Hillmer and J.L. Granatstein, For Better Or For Worse. Canada and the United States to the 1990s (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1991); J.L. Granatstein, “The myth of the broken Arrow,” The Globe And Mail, 11 January 1997, D2; and J.L. Granatstein, Yankee go home? Canadians and anti-Americanism (Toronto: HarperCollins, 1996).

49. “The legacy of the Avro Arrow,” A2.

50. See the acknowledgment page at the beginning of this thesis for a list of institutions which were consulted during the research for this case study. Corporate documents held by the successor company, Hawker-Siddeley Canada Limited, are not open to the general public. The extent of Hawker-Siddeley’s holdings is unknown, apparently even to the company itself, and may in fact be nonexistent.

Chapter Two:

1. Stevenson, 1, quoting Frederic A. Bergerson, The Army Gets an Air Force. Tactics Of Insurgent Bureaucratic Politics (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), 156.

2. See Michael Bliss, “Canada’s Swell War,” Saturday Night, May 1995, 39-41, 64.

3. Cecil Law, George Lindsey, and David Grenville, “Foreword,” in Perspectives in Science and Technology. The Legacy of Omond Solandt. Proceedings of a symposium held at the Donald Gordon Centre, Queen’s University at Kingston, Ontario, 8-10 May 1994, ed. C.E. Law, G.R. Lindsey, and D.M. Grenville (Kingston: Queen’s Quarterly, 1995), vii.

4. D.J. Goodspeed, A History Of The Defence Research Board Of Canada (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1958), 102. Goodspeed notes that the phrase was coined by US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt during a visit to Ottawa in 1942.

5. J. de N. Kennedy, History of the Department of Munitions and Supply. Canada In The Second World War, vol. I, Production Branches and Crown Companies (Ottawa: King’s Printer and Controller of Controller of Stationery, 1950), 25. The industry had not, however, produced a single engine. See also H. Duncan Hall, North American Supply (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1955).

6. At various time Howe held the Marine and Railways, Transport, Munitions and Supply, Reconstruction, Industry, Trade, and Commerce, and Defence Production portfolios. See Robert Bothwell and William Kilbourn, C. D. Howe. A Biography (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1980).

7. Bothwell and Kilbourn, 189-191. A second area of specialization was shipbuilding. Earlier in his ministerial career, Howe had established Trans-Canada Airlines.

8. Lukasiewicz, 224.

9. Trevor Lloyd, Canada in World Affairs 1957-1959, vol. 10 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968), 49.

10. Goodspeed, 103. This attitude appears to be rooted in a single incident which occurred in 1942 when Canada believed it was in danger of Japanese attack. Wilfrid Curtis, then Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the RCAF in England, appeared before an allied allotment board to plead for Canadian-built fighters, but the planes were allotted to the Soviet Union instead. “Maybe they did need the planes more than we did, I don’t know. But I do know that we needed them very badly. And I realized right then, walking out of that meeting and feeling every inch a failure, that until we didn’t have to tip our hats to anyone to get aircraft when we needed them, we’d never have the air force a first rate nation really deserves.” Stewart, 62. As an Air Marshal, Curtis would later command the RCAF (1947-1953) and initiate the preliminary design study for the Arrow. After retirement he would become Vice-Chairman of the Board of A.V. Roe. See W.A. Curtis, “Developing Canada’s Air Defences,” Saturday Night, 2 May 1953, 7-9.

11. Lawrence R. Aronsen, “A Leading Arsenal of Democracy,” 481-501; Fred Gaffen, “Canada’s Military Aircraft Industry: Its Birth, Growth, and Fortunes,”Canadian Defence Quarterly 15, no. 2 (Autumn 1985): 51-53; and Danford W. Middlemiss, “The Political Economy of Defence: Dimensions of Government Involvement in the Canadian Aircraft Industry,” Paper presented at the 50th Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, University of Western Ontario, London, 1978, 6. See also the “buff books” on the Arrow and the theses by Berg; Gregory David Brown, “The Road to the Arrow: A.V. Roe Canada Limited and the Development of the Canadian Aircraft Industry” (MA Thesis, Acadia University, 1979); and Shaw, “The Influence of Post-War Continental Air-Defence Strategies and National Economic Development Policies on the Industrial Organization of the Canadian Aerospace Industry.”

12. Hereinafter referred to as A.V. Roe. A.V. Roe was reorganized in 1954, becoming the parent (or holding) company. It was named for Alliot Verdon Roe, the founder of Britain’s A.V. Roe Limited, one of Hawker-Siddeley’s aircraft companies. See Bill Gunston, The Plane Makers (London: Basinghall Books Limited, 1980).

13. Today the site of Toronto’s Pearson International Airport.

14. Hereinafter referred to as Avro. Formed out of Victory Aircraft Limited, Avro was actually known as the Aircraft Division of A.V. Roe until 1954.

15. Hereinafter referred to as Orenda. Formed out of Turbo Research Limited, Orenda was actually known as the Engine Division of A.V. Roe until 1954.

16. Marjorie Earl, “How Roy Dobson pushed us into the jet age,” Maclean’s, 20 July 1957, 13. Dobson once said: “I often used to dream of a little empire in Canada.” Earl, 49.

17. The Jetliner was a commercial transcontinental jet transport. In 1949, the prototype took flight. It missed becoming the first aircraft of its type to fly in the world by only thirteen days. The Jetliner’s demise effectively ended any chance Avro had of diversifying into the civilian aviation market. See James C. Floyd, The Avro C-102 Jetliner (Erin: The Boston Mills Press, 1986); William Mellberg, “The World’s Second, North America’s First,” Air Enthusiast no. 46 (Summer 1992): 52-61; and Molson and Taylor.

18. Don Munton, “Going fission: tales and truths about Canada’s nuclear weapons,” International Journal LI, no. 3 (Summer 1996): 506.

19. Reg Whitaker and Gary Marcuse, Cold War Canada: The Making of a National Security State, 1945-1957 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), xi. See also Denis Smith, Diplomacy of fear: Canada and the Cold War, 1941-1948 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988). In 1951, partially in response to the Korean War, a three-year, $5 billion defence programme was approved and higher manpower ceiling authorized, which amounted to a tripling of the size of the armed forces and a tenfold increase in the defence budget since 1947. John M. Treddenick, “The Defence Budget,” in Canada’s International Security Policy, ed. David B. Dewitt and David Leyton-Brown (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall
Canada Inc., 1995), 429.

20. Aronsen, “Canada’s Postwar Re-armament,” 176, quoting House of Commons Debates, 27 November 1952, 136-137.

21. Treddenick, 429-430.

22. de N. Kennedy, 3.

23. Dow, 43.

24. DHH/DND, Foulkes Papers, 1. The Bull was a copy of the American Boeing Aircraft Company B-29 Superfortress, the bomber which had dropped the atomic bombs “Little Boy” and “Fat Man” on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It had been reverse-engineered from Superfortresses which made forced landings in the Soviet Union during the Second World War.

25. DHH/DND, the Raymont Collection, Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee (hereinafter CSC Papers), series 1, 73/1223, file 632, CF-105 Aircraft 01/30/58-08/19/58, “Report On The Development Of the CF105 Aircraft And Associated Weapon System 1952- 1958,” (hereinafter CSC Report), 19 August 1958, 1.

26. Joseph T. Jockel, “From Demobilization to the New Look: Canadian and American Military Rearmament, 1945-1953,” Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Historical Association, Dalhousie University, Halifax, 1981, 26.

27. The academic literature on Canada-US cooperation in the area of continental defence during this period is voluminous. For a representative sample of the literature see Conant, The Long Polar Watch; Conant, “Canada and Continental Defence;” Christopher Conliffe, “The Permanent Joint Board on Defense, 1940-1988,” in The US-Canada Security Relationship. The Politics, Strategy, and Technology of Defense, ed. David G. Haglund and Joel J. Sokolsky (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1989), 145-165; David Cox, Canada and NORAD, 1958-1978: a Cautionary Retrospective, Aurora Papers 1 (Ottawa: The Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, 1985); Brian Crane, An Introduction to Canadian Defence Policy (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1964); Brian Cuthbertson, Canadian Military Independence in the Age of the Superpowers (Toronto: Fitzhenry & Whiteside Limited, 1977); General Charles Foulkes, “Canadian Defence Policy in a Nuclear Age,” Behind The Headlines XXI (May 1961): 1-19; General Charles Foulkes, “The Complications of Continental Defence,” in Neighbours Taken For Granted: Canada and the United States, ed. Livingston T. Merchant (New York: Praeger, 1966), 101-133; Granatstein, Canada 1957-1967; Commander Peter T. Haydon, The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered (Toronto: The Canadian Institute Of Strategic Studies, 1993); Joseph T. Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States, and the Origins of North American Air Defence, 1945-1958 (Vancouver: The University of British Columbia Press, 1987); Jospeh T. Jockel, “The Military Establishments And The Creation Of NORAD,” American Review of Canadian Studies 12, no. 3 (Fall 1982): 1-16, also in Canada’s Defence. Perspectives On Policy In The Twentieth Century, ed. B.D. Hunt and R.G. Haycock (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1993), 163-178; George Lindsey, “Canada-US Defense Relations in the Cold War,” in Fifty Years Of Canada-United States Defense Cooperation. The Road From Ogdensburg, ed. Joel J. Sokolsky and Joseph T. Jockel (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellon Press, 1992), 59-82; Lloyd; Jon B. McLin, Canada’s Changing Defence Policy, 1957-1963: The Problems of a Middle Power in Alliance (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967; Middlemiss and Sokolsky; James M. Minifie, Peacemaker or Powdermonkey: Canada’s Role in a Revolutionary World. (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Limited, 1960); Desmond Morton, Canada and War. A Military and Political History. Political Issues In Their Historical Perspectives Series, ed. George A. Rawlyk and Bruce W. Hodgins (Toronto: Butterworth & Co. (Canada) Ltd., 1981); Desmond Morton, A Military History of Canada (Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers Ltd., 1985); Richard A. Preston, “The Cost of Palimony: Canada’s Military Dependence on the United States,” War & Society 1, no. 2 (September 1983): 85-104; Shaw, “The Influence of Post-War Continental Air-Defence Strategies and National Economic Development Policies on the Industrial Organization of the Canadian Aerospace Industry;” Joel J. Sokolsky, “A Seat At The Table: Canada And Its Alliances,” Armed Forces and Society 16, no. 1 (Fall 1989): 11-35, also in Canada’s Defence. Perspectives On Policy In The Twentieth Century, ed. B.D. Hunt and R.G. Haycock (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1993), 145-162; John W. Warnock, Partner To Behemoth. The Military Policy of a Satellite Canada (Toronto: New Press, 1970); Whitaker and Marcuse; and William R. Willoughby, The Joint Organizations of Canada and the United States (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979).

28. David Jay Bercuson, True Patriot. The Life of Brooke Claxton 1898-1960 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 246.

29. Unlike the Arrow, few Canadians know the Canuck ever existed. See Bob Baglow, Canucks Unlimited: Royal Canadian Air Force CF-100 squadrons and aircraft, 1952-1963 (Ottawa: Canuck Publications, 1985); Robert Bradford, “Canadian Innovation - CF-100 Story,” Air Enthusiast, no. 4 (Winter 1981): 152-166; James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: Growing Up Allied (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980); James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: Peacemaking And Deterrence (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972);Don Henley, “Singular Customer. Belgium and the Avro Canada CF-100,” Air Enthusiast, no. 68 (March/April 1997): 60-63; James Hornick, “The CF-100: Canada’s Boldest, Costliest Aircraft Venture,” Saturday Night, 18 January 1958; Larry Milberry, The Avro CF-100 (Toronto: CANAV Books, 1981); Molson and Taylor; and Ron D. Page, Canuck. CF-100 All Weather Fighter (Erin: The Boston Mills Press, 1981).

30. House of Commons, Debates, 12 September 1958, 3230. In air force parlance this is referred to as the NIH syndrome, or “not-invented-here.”

31. The specification that would lead to the Arrow was designated OR 1/1-63 “Supersonic All-Weather Interceptor Aircraft,” and the design study to meet it was designated AIR 7-3 “Design Studies of a Prototype Supersonic All-Weather Aircraft.”

32. DHH/DND, CSC Report, 1; and DHH/DND, Foulkes Papers, 8-9.

33. Stewart, 180.

34. House of Commons, Special Committee on Defence Expenditures, Minutes of Proceedings And Evidence (hereinafter Halpenny Committee), No. 5 (20 May 1960), 127.

35. McLin, 63.

36. DHH/DND, CSC Report, 1-2; and DHH/DND, Foulkes Papers, 2-3.

37. National Archives of Canada (hereinafter NAC), Clarence Decatur Howe Papers, MG 27, III, B20 (hereinafter Howe Papers), vol. 48, file 4, A.V. Roe Canada Limited, 1952, C.D. Howe to Brooke Claxton, 19 December 1952. See also DHH/DND, Foulkes Papers, 4.

38. Bothwell and Kilbourn, 131.

39. Dow, 43-44; and Stewart, 137-142. “Aviation technology was costly, Howe learned, as well as slow and quirky. The headaches connected with the production of the CF-100 even caused Howe to dispatch one of his DDP officials, Crawford Gordon, to Malton to see if he could straighten out the mess. He could not; instead of a solution, the heavy-drinking Gordon became in Howe’s eyes part of the problem.” Bothwell and Kilbourn, 266. See also Crawford Gordon, Jr., "A Brief On The Probable Developments In The Aviation Industry In Canada And Their Effects On The Canadian Economy," Briefs Prepared For The Royal Commission On Canada's Economic Prospects, 1956.

40. Middlemiss and Sokolsky, 65.

41. Bothwell and Kilbourn, 267.

42. Halpenny Committee, No.3 (17 May 1960), 89.

43. DHH/DND, CSC, 6 October 1953, 3-4. Although DHH/DND, Defence Council Minutes, Vice-Chiefs of Staff Committee Minutes, and Air Council Minutes were also consulted in the course of researching this case study, only the Air Council Minutes contained relevant discussion on the Arrow programme. However, because the Air Council minutes normally reflect what was presented to the CSC by the CAS, they will not be cited in this thesis.

44. DHH/DND, CSC, 6 October 1953, 3.

45. Foulkes would be promoted to General shortly thereafter. See David J. Bercuson and J.L. Granatstein, Dictionary of Canadian Military History (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1992).

46. On the enormous influence of Solandt on defence research in Canada see also Goodspeed and Law, Lindsey, and Grenville. Oddly, the Arrow is barely mentioned in either book.

47. DHH/DND, CSC, 25 November 1953, 3-4.

48. NAC, Records of the Privy Council Office, RG2, Cabinet Defence Committee Conclusions (hereinafter referred to as CDC), 2 December 1953, 1-2, with reference to Minister’s Memorandum, 30 November 1953, Cabinet Document D49-53. It should be noted that conclusions of the CDC and the CSC rarely attribute recorded comments to a particular minister other those who are making presentations.

49. NAC, CDC, 2 December 1953, 1.

50. NAC, CDC, 2 December 1953, 2.

51. NAC, Records of the Privy Council Office, RG2, Cabinet Conclusions (hereinafter CC), 17 December 1953, 13. See also House of Commons, Sessional Papers 837, 838, nos.198, 198a-d (1959); House of Commons, Standing Committee on Estimates, Minutes of Proceedings And Evidence, No. 1 (5 June 1958), and No. 12 (7 July 1958); and DHH/DND, CSC Report, for further contractual and financial information on the project.

52. DHH/DND, Foulkes Papers, 3.

53. McLin, 67-68.

54. NAC, Records of the Department of National Defence, RG24 (hereinafter DND), acc. 83-84/167, box 6426, file S1038-CN-180, CF-105 Arrow Aircraft - General, 1952-1962, pt. 2, General N.F. Twining to Air Marshal C.R. Slemon, 28 June 1954, and Air Marshal C.R. Slemon to General N.F. Twining, 14 July 1954. See also DHH/DND, CSC Report, Appendix G. A team from the RCAF, Avro and Orenda would brief ARDC in August 1954.

55. The Bison was the greater threat as it was a bomber similar, though inferior, to the American Boeing Aircraft Company B-52 Stratofortress. DHH/DND, CSC Report, 1-2; and DHH/DND, Foulkes Papers, 4-5.

56. Sauvé Committee, No. 14 (17 October 1963), 447.

57. DHH/DND, CSC, 11 February 1955, 1-4.

58. DHH/DND, CSC, 11 February 1955, 2.

59. DHH/DND, CSC, 11 February 1955, 2.

60. DHH/DND, CSC, 11 February 1955, 3.

61. DHH/DND, CSC, 11 February 1955, 2.

62. DHH/DND, CSC, 11 February 1955, 3. BOMARC refers to the IM-99 surface-to-air missile developed by the Boeing Airplane Company and the University of Michigan’s Aeronautical Research Centre. The RCAF was interested in the “B” version of the BOMARC, which carried a nuclear warhead.

63. DHH/DND, CSC, 11 February 1955, 4. See also DHH/DND, Foulkes Papers, 6-7.

64. NAC, CDC, 3 March 1955, 3-5, with reference to Minister’s Memoranda, 1 March 1955, Cabinet Document D6-55, and 25 February 1955, Cabinet Document D7-55.

65. NAC, CDC, 3 March 1955, 3.

66. The US-designed North American Aviation F-86 Sabre was licence-built in Montreal by Canadair Limited. Designated CL-13 by the RCAF, it was powered by an Orenda engine. Canadair would build 1815 Sabres. See Larry Milberry, The Canadair Sabre (Toronto: CANAV Books, 1986); Larry Milberry and Ron Pickler, Canadair: The First 50 Years (Toronto: CANAV Books, 1995); and Molson and Taylor.

67. NAC, CDC, 3 March 1955, 3. At its peak strength the Air Division was composed of eight regular Sabre squadrons and four regular Canuck squadrons, nearly 300 aircraft in total. The CDC also indicated that though the Arrow’s mission was anticipated to be defensive, because of the reduction in size of atomic weapons the aircraft might be convertible to a short-range offensive mission. However, the RCAF never seriously considered replacing the Sabre with the Arrow, and though it did undertake a preliminary design study on the Arrow as a tactical nuclear bomber, that idea went nowhere. See NAC, DND, acc. 83-84/167, box 6426, file S1038CN-180-5187A, CF-105 Arrow Aircraft - General, 1952-1962, pts. 1-6.

68. NAC, CDC, 3 March 1955, 3.

69. NAC, CDC, 3 March 1955, 3.

70. NAC, CDC, 3 March 1955, 4.

71. NAC, CC, 8 March 1955, 13-15.

72. NAC, CC, 8 March 1955, 14-15. The first five Arrow I aircraft would be powered by American-built Pratt and Whitney J-75 engines, and the next thirty-five Arrow II aircraft by the initially unavailable Iroquois.

73. NAC, CC, 8 March 1955, 14.

74. NAC, CC, 23 March 1955, 19-21.

75. NAC, CC, 23 March 1955, 21.

76. NAC, CC, 23 March 1955, 20.

77. Undertaken at the Canadian Armament Research and Development Establishment (CARDE), the NRC, the NAE, and the US National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics (NACA), the forerunner of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).

78. DHH/DND, CSC, 11 February 1995, 2. See also DHH/DND, Foulkes Papers, 5.

79. Michael E. Brown, Flying Blind. The Politics Of The U.S. Strategic Bomber Program (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 177. The procedure is also known as systems engineering or concurrency.

80. Robert F. Coulam, Illusions of Choice. The F-111 and the Problem of Weapons Acquisition Reform (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 207-208. See also Glenn E. Bugos, Engineering The F-4 Phantom II. Parts Into Systems (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996); and Bill Gunston, Early Supersonic Fighters of the West (Shepperton: Ian Allen Ltd., 1976).

81. House of Commons, Debates, 28 June 1955, 5380.

82. Robert Bothwell, “Defense And Industry In Canada, 1935-1970,” in War, Business, And World Military-Industrial Complexes, ed. Benjamin Franklin Cooling (Port Washington, New York: Kennikat Press Corp, 1981), 115.

83. Paul Hellyer, Damn The Torpedoes. My Fight To Unify Canada’s Armed Forces (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1990), 129. Hellyer, who was also briefly Associate MND in 1957, also complains about having to “force the RCAF’s size-twelve budgetary foot into Cinderella’s size-six appropriation shoe.” Hellyer, 131.

84. NAC, CDC, 27 September 1955, 1-3, with reference to Minister’s Memorandum, 26 September 1955, Cabinet Document D16-55.

85. During 1954 the DRB and NAE had also challenged Avro’s performance calculations. Avro was vindicated after a third-party evaluation by NACA, but this dispute held up the Arrow programme. Disagreements between DRB, NRC, and NAE on the one hand and Avro on the other over the technical aspects of the Arrow would flare up periodically during the early years of the programme. Smye, 66. See also Campagna, Storms Of Controversy.

86. Howe also noted that if the Arrow programme were ended, there would be $13 million in cancellation charges. NAC, CDC, 27 September 1955, 2.

87. The team would report to a panel comprised of the CAS (as Chair), the DM, DND, the Chairman of the DRB, and the DM, DDP, as well as representatives from the Privy Council Office, the Departments of Finance and External Affairs, and the NRC. DHH/DND, CSC Report, 4; and DHH/DND, Foulkes Papers 7-8.

88. NAC, CC, 28 September 1955, 5-6.

89. NAC, CC, 28 September 1955, 5.

90. DHH/DND, CSC, 1 November 1955, 1-10.

91. The report considered and rejected two other courses of action which involved improving the Canuck, procuring the BOMARC, and either purchasing an alternative American interceptor or foregoing a supersonic interceptor altogether. NAC, DND, 83-84/226, vol. 20886, file CSC 10:9, pt. 4, Canada, Manufacture of Aircraft, 1948-1964, (Top Secret) 1948-1955, “Report By The Working Group To The Ad Hoc Departmental Committee For The Reappraisal Of The CF105 Development Programme,” n.d., 4, 6. Another lengthy and extremely useful report, its appendices contain individual reports from the Plans Analysis and Requirements Group, Comparison Group (Fighters), Comparison Group (Missiles), Cost Analysis Group, a report on US and UK aircraft design and development programmes, and a report on the phasing in of weapons in air defence system with relation to the enemy threat.

92. Air Vice-Marshal Miller had been Vice-CAS (1951-1955) and as an Air Marshal was later Chairman of the CSC (1960-1964) and Chief of the Defence Staff (1964-1966). See Bercuson and Granatstein.

93. See DHH/DND, CSC Report, Appendix B, Annex I, and Appendix E, Annex I, for the submissions to the CDC, which more or less reflected the five courses of action discussed. The CSC Committee reconvened briefly on 3 November 1955 to consider the revised submission. One of the edits approved was the deletion of the word “cheaper” from references to an alternative American interceptor.

94. DHH/DND, CSC, 1 November 1955, 7.

95. DHH/DND, Foulkes Papers, 8-9.

96. DHH/DND, CSC, 1 November 1955, 9.

97. The total defence budgets during the Arrow programme were as follows: 1952 -1953, $1.882.4 billion; 1953-1954, $1.805.9 billion; 1954-1955, $1.666.0 billion; 1955-1956, 1.750.1 billion; 1956-1957, $1.424.7 billion; 1957-1958, 1.668.5 billion; 1958-1959, $1.424.7 billion; 1959-1960, $1.514.9 billion. The defence budget more or less stabilized at this level for the rest of the Conservative government. R.B. Byers, “Canadian Defence and Defence Procurement: Implications for Economic Policy,” in Selected Problems in Formulating Foreign Economic Policy, Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada, ed. Denis Stairs, Gilbert R. Winham, vol. 30 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), 142. See also DDP, “Defence Expenditure And Its Influence On The Canadian Economy,” Special Studies Prepared For The Special Committee Of The House Of Commons On Matters Relating To Defence, Supplement 1964-1965, 95-107; and Treddenick.

98. Howard Graham, Citizen And Soldier. The Memoirs of Lieutenant-General Howard Graham (Toronto: McLelland and Stewart, 1987), 237. See also DHH/DND, Foulkes Papers, 3-4. The CNS was never a particularly vocal member of the CSC when the Arrow programme was on the agenda.

99. NAC, CDC, 8 November 1955, 1.

100. NAC, CDC, 17 November 1955, 1, with reference to Minister’s Memorandum, 4 November 1955, Cabinet Document D22-55.

101. NAC, CDC, 8 November 1955, 1.

102. NAC, CC, 7 December 1955, 11-15, with reference to Minister’s Memoranda, 5 December 1955, Cabinet Document D241-55, and 6 December 1955, Cabinet Document D242-55.

103. NAC, CC, 7 December 1955, 13.

104. NAC, CC, 7 December 1955, 13. Campney added that if the Arrow programme was ended there would be $17.7 million in cancellation charges and the government would then have to explain why it had spent over $50 million on the project.

105. NAC, CC, 7 December 1955, 13. Foulkes was sympathetic to Cabinet’s plight as “a $300 million flop in Canada could be enough to unseat the government.” DHH/DND, Foulkes Papers, 12.

106. At the request of Slemon and Solandt, on 31 October and 1 November 1955, USAF team visited Avro and Orenda and evaluated the Arrow and the Iroquois in order to offer an independent opinion on their technical and operational soundness. In a letter to Campney, Quarles wrote that the terms of reference given to the team were “should the RCAF proceed with development and production of the CF-105 in the face of a firm US Air Force programme for the development and production of the F-102B medium range interceptor; the F-101B long range interceptor; and the LRIX I, which is being developed to replace the F-101B?” Quarles relayed that the team recommended that the Arrow programme proceed as planned. DHH/DND, CSC Report, Appendix C, Donald A. Quarles to Ralph Campney, 9 November 1955. See also Appendix G, 1-2.

107. NAC, CC, 7 December 1955, 12.

108. NAC, CC, 7 December 1955, 14.

109. DHH/DND, Foulkes Papers, 12.

110. DHH/DND, Foulkes Papers, 13. Foulkes added that the RCAF’s adherence to this principle “caused the Chiefs of Staff to accept the inflated costs of completing the CF-105, instead of insisting on the acquisition of a fully developed Untied States aircraft in 1956.” DHH/DND, Foulkes Papers, 41.

111. Dow, 95, quoting Fred Smye.

112. McLin, 64-66.

113. DHH/DND, CSC Report, 3-4, and Appendix A, Annex IV; DHH/DND, Foulkes Papers, 7, 11-13; and Smye, 69-70. At the 7 December 1955 Cabinet meeting, $65 million had been approved for the Sparrow II programme until 1965. Canadair Limited was awarded the contract to produce the Sparrow II and other Canadian companies would be subcontractors. Originally, the NRC/CARDE Velvet Glove missile programme had been the anticipated armament for the Arrow but it was determined that the Sparrow II would be more effective. Velvet Glove was cancelled in 1954 after $24 million had been spent. DHH/DND, Foulkes Papers, 7. See also Goodspeed; and Milberry and Pickler.

114. Hereinafter referred to as Astra. DHH/DND, CSC Report, Appendix A, Annex III; DHH/DND, Foulkes Papers, 7, 11-13; and Smye 68-69. An electronics system includes a radar fire control, navigation, communications, and flight control system. The Astra contract went to the American Radio Corporation of America (RCA), which had limited experience in the field, and there were also Canadian subcontractors. Astra would also allow the Arrow to carry the Douglas Aircraft Company MB-1 Genie missile, an unguided nuclear air-to-air missile. According to the CSC Report, at the 8 March 1955 Cabinet meeting, $15 million was allowed for procurement of a US electronic system and $5 million for its adaptation to the Arrow, but this is not recorded in the CC. DHH/DND, CSC Report, Appendix A.

115. Brown, “The Road to the Arrow,” 122, quoting Air Marshal Wilfrid Curtis.

116. Gunston, 123. Avro personnel wryly suggested that Astra stood for “astronomically expensive.” Gunston, 129.

117. Mellberg, “Too Good To Be True?,” 54 Floyd, though not unsympathetic to the problems the Arrow programme faced, naturally in condemnatory of the government for its eventual decision to cancel. “The real problem of the cost of the Arrow was that the government of the day knew nothing about the cost or worth of high technology. Anyone who imagines that high technology runs cheap doesn’t understand the subject.” Mellberg, “To Good To Be True?,” 57.

118. On the RCAF during this postwar period, see Eayrs, Peacemaking And Deterrence; Larry Milberry, Sixty Years. The RCAF and CF Air Command 1924-1984 (Toronto: CANAV Books, 1984); and Jeff Rankin-Lowe, “A Decade of Air Power. Royal Canadian Air Force 1950-1959: Part I and Part II” Wings Of Fame. The Journal Of Classic Combat Aircraft, 2 and 3 (1996): 142-157, 142-157

119. See Tom Wolfe, The Right Stuff (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1979), on the fighter pilot culture.

120. Danford W. Middlemiss, “A Pattern of Cooperation: The Case of the Canadian- American Defence Production and Development Sharing Agreements, 1958-1963" (PhD diss: University of Toronto, 1975), 188.

121. Admittedly, Simonds had another axe to grind: he had always believed that he was more worthy of the post of Chairman, CSC, than Foulkes: “More realistic, much more political, Foulkes stayed on as Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff and took Canada into the North American Air Defence Command, masterminded the scrapping of the Avro Arrow, and led John Diefenbaker’s government into its politically fateful decision to accept nuclear weapons. He retired in 1960, more than two years before the controversy over the BOMARC blew up in Diefenbaker’s face and destroyed his government. The tortoise and hare analogy is not inappropriate for the race between Guy Simonds and Charles Foulkes. Simonds clearly outdistanced Foulkes in wartime, but Foulkes more than made up the ground and retained his lead in the postwar years. For all his undoubted military ability, Simonds lacked Foulkes’ political sense, and it was Foulkes, not Simonds, who became Canada’s most powerful military mandarin and the creator of the postwar Canadian armed forces.” J.L. Granatstein, The Generals. The Canadian Army’s Senior Commanders In The Second World War (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing Co. Limited, 1993), 177-178. See also Dominick Graham, The Price of Command. A Biography of General Guy Simonds (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing Co. Limited, 1993).

122. Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds, “Where We’ve Gone Wrong On Defense,” Maclean’s, 23 June 1956, 66. Simonds was not the only disgruntled general. See also Major-General W.H.S. Macklin, “The costly folly of our defense policy,” Maclean’s, 18 February 1956, 21-22, 50-56. Their attitudes reflected a missile-versus-manned aircraft debate which was raging within the American, British, Soviet, and other militaries at the time.

123. Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds, “We’re wasting millions on an obsolete air force,” Maclean’s, 4 August 1956, 39.

124. Simonds, “Where We’ve Gone Wrong On Defense,” 66. Simonds’ military instincts were sharp, but he also advocated conscription, proving that his political instincts were considerably duller.

125. Simonds, “We’re wasting millions on an obsolete air force,” 38.

126. Warnock, 128.

127. NAC, Howe Papers, vol. 49, file 7, A.V. Roe Canada Limited, 1955-1956, Sir Reginald Maulding to C.D. Howe, 19 June 1956. See also DHH/DND, CSC Report, Appendix G, 2-4.

128. DHH/DND, CSC, 11 January 1957, 4.

129. At a Special Meeting of the CSC on 28 January 1957, held to review their submission to the CDC, Slemon moderated his stance on the Arrow somewhat, emphasizing that “it was no part of RCAF thinking that the CF-105 project must be continued simply because of the large expenditures already incurred. The decision to proceed with the aircraft must rest on it merits alone.” DHH/DND, CSC, 28 January 1957, 3. Although not included in the submission , the overall cost of the thirty-seven Arrows was estimated to be $500-$600 million. DHH/DND, CSC Report, Appendix A.

130. NAC, CDC, 6 and 7 February 1957, 1-4, with reference to Minister’s Memorandum, 30 January 1957, Cabinet Document D3-57.

131. NAC, CC, 17 February 1957, 6.

132. NAC, CC, 17 February 1957, 6.

Chapter Three:

1. Stevenson, 305.

2. Pearkes had served as Conservative defence critic while in Opposition. Despite his army background, Pearkes viewed the RCAF as Canada’s first line of defence and he supported the idea that the RCAF introduce advanced interceptors and surface-to-air missiles. Reginald Roy, For Most Conspicuous Bravery: A Biography of Major General George R. Pearkes, V.C., Through Two World Wars (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1977), 277-278.

3. DHH/DND, Foulkes Papers, 14. The newly elected Conservatives would not have been informed as to the deliberations of the Liberals as “it is an essential tradition that, on a change of Government, the minutes of meetings of the outgoing Cabinet are not made available to the Ministers forming the new Cabinet. In forming its appreciation of any inherited problem, a new ministry is therefore dependent upon whatever position papers departmental officials may prepare for their new Minister, and upon the judgement of individual Ministers and Privy Council advisers in bringing points before council meetings.” Patrick Nicholson, Vision and Indecision (Don Mills: Longmans Canada Limited, 1968), 198-199.

4. Treddenick, 431.

5. Granatstein, Canada 1957-1967, 105.

6. DHH/DND, Foulkes Papers, 16-17. Foulkes’ opinion of the Conservatives was not shared by every officer. “The changeover from a Liberal to a Conservative government in mid-1957 resulted in no alterations to our defence policy or our commitments under that policy. However, it did involve a considerable amount of extra work in briefing the new Minister on details.” Graham, 236.

7. Roy, 340-341.

8. Diefenbaker was also serving as SSEA. DHH/DND, Foulkes Papers, 14; and Jockel, 104-106. See also John Meisel, “Guns And Butter: Foreign Affairs In Canada’s Twenty-Third Parliament,” International Journal XIII (Summer 1958): 184-203.

9. Sauvé Committee, No. 15 (22 October 1963), 510.

10. See J.L. Granatstein, “The American Influence On The Canadian Military, 1939- 1963,” Canadian Military History 2 (Spring 1993): 69-70, also in Canada’s Defence. Perspectives On Policy In The Twentieth Century, ed. B.D. Hunt and R.G. Haycock (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1993), 129-139.

11. Cox, 22; and Richter, 2-3.

12. Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs, 56.

13. Cox, 22.

14. McLin, 47-48.

15. Foulkes, 16; and John F. Hilliker, “The Politicians and the ‘Pearsonalities’: The Diefenbaker Government and the Conduct of Canada’s External Relations,” in Historical Papers/Communications Historiques (1984):151-167, also in Canadian Foreign Policy. Historical Readings, rev. ed., ed. J.L. Granatstein (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1993), 223. See also John Hilliker and Donald Barry, Canada’s Department of External Affairs. Volume II. Coming of Age, 1946-1968 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1995). Of course, as Diefenbaker later pointed out, Foulkes’ “admiration for the St. Laurent government was obvious and may explain his decision, following his retirement, to contest a Liberal Party nomination.” John G. Diefenbaker, One Canada Memoirs of the Right Honourable John G. Diefenbaker. The Tumultuous Years. 1962-1967, vol. 3 (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada Limited, 1977), 17.

16. “One of [Diefenbaker’s] favourite targets was Air Marshal Hugh Campbell....During one cabinet session which I was asked to attend Diefenbaker attacked Campbell so viciously [the MND] finally intervened and said that this kind of abuse of a senior air officer was unacceptable.” Ignatieff, 187.

17. Roy, 324. “Air Marshal Curtis who was the innovator and principal proponent of the Arrow program, retired in 1953 as Chief of the RCAF and immediately went to work for Avro as Vice-President (I always questioned, in my mind, the propriety of this action).” Graham, 237. Avro, however, knew why he had been hired: “Curtis had built the post-war air force. He had fought tooth and nail for the lion’s share of the defence budget...Those donkeys in the Chiefs of Staff Committee were anti-air force and were all former colleagues of Pearkes. Curtis had ridden all over them.” Stewart, 181, quoting Fred Smye.

18. Donald M. Fleming, So Very Near. The Political Memoirs Of The Honourable Donald M. Fleming. The Rising Years (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1985), 414. Unfortunately, the memoirs of other Conservative ministers and insiders are less than informative. See the following works for brief mentions of the Arrow programme: Ellen Louks Fairclough, Saturday’s Child: Memoirs of Canada’s First Female Cabinet Minister (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995); Heath Macquarrie, Red Tory Blues. A Political Memoir (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992); Erik Nielsen, The House Is Not A Home (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989); Pierre Sevigny, This Game Of Politics (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1965); Dick Spencer, Trumpets and Drums. John Diefenbaker on the Campaign Trail (Vancouver, Greystone Books, 1994); and David Jones Walker, Fun Along The Way: Memoirs of David Walker (Toronto: Robertson Press, 1987).

19. Patrick Kyba, Alvin: A Biography of the Honourable Alvin Hamilton, P.C. (Regina: Canadian Plains Research Centre, 1989), 201.

20. NAC, CDC, 19 September 1957, 1-8, with reference to Minister’s Memorandum, 18 September 1957, Cabinet Document D12-57.

21. NAC, CDC, 19 September 1957, 6. Pearkes added that “having in mind the order of magnitude of the defence budget that might be available for the next few years, he had grave doubts whether these previously announced commitments could be met and Canadian forces continue to be equipped with modern weapons.” NAC, CDC, 20 September 1957, 3. See also Treddenick.

22. NAC, CC, 20 September 1957, 1- 6. However, even though the Mark VI version (as the improved Canuck was designated) was cancelled, it was still necessary to order thirty-five additional Mark V versions for the RCAF to meet operational requirements until the Arrow was deployed.

23. A ground environment is an electronic system which controls interceptors and missiles.

24. NAC, CDC, 19 April 1956, 1-2. The RCAF originally stated a minimum requirement for twenty-one squadrons and bases, but Slemon “recognized that even this minimum requirement of the air defence system might be beyond the capabilities of Canada. As practically every element of air defence in Canada was a direct contribution to the air defence of the United States, there are good arguments in favour of sharing the cost, and there was reason to believe the United States authorities would continue to share this view.” The CSC tended to downplay the fact that the US air defence bases in Alaska and Greenland contributed likewise to the air defence of Canada. The CSC considered this plan at the CSC meeting on 1 November 1955, and the amended version was part of Slemon’s briefing to the CDC meeting on 8 November 1955.

25. NAC, CDC, 13 June 1956, 1-2, with reference to Minister’s Memorandum, 16 April 1956, Cabinet Document D2-56. There is no record of the plan coming before Cabinet, possibly because it was only approved in principle.

26. DHH/DND, CSC, 6 and 7 February 1957, 1-2.

27. NAC, DND, vol. 20054, file Arrow 2, DND Public Relations File, “Address by the Hon. George R. Pearkes, VC, Minister of National Defence, Avro Arrow Roll Out Ceremony, Avro Aircraft Ltd., Malton, Ontario,” 4 October 1957, 5.

28. NAC, DND, vol. 20054, file Arrow 2, DND Public Relations File, “Address by the Hon. George R. Pearkes, VC, Minister of National Defence, Avro Arrow Roll Out Ceremony, Avro Aircraft Ltd., Malton, Ontario,” 4 October 1957, 3-4.

29. NIEs were largely based on American Lockheed California Company U-2 spyplane overflights of the Soviet Union. See Donald P. Steury, ed., Intentions And Capabilities Estimates On Soviet Strategic Forces, 1950-1983 (Washington: Centre For The Study Of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1996); and DHH/DND, 73/1223, series 1, file 10, “Air Defence Requirements, 11/30/55-07/29/58, “Estimates of Soviet Threat to North America from Aircraft and Missiles,” 20 August 1958.

30. Sandys wholehearted embrace of the missile over the manned aircraft can be traced to his wartime experience with the “Crossbow” Committee. Sandys was Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Supply when he was charged by Prime Minister Winston Churchill in April 1942 with chairing the Committee. The Committee’s mandate was to investigate all available intelligence on the German V-1 and V-2 rocket programmes and to devise countermeasures against attack by such rockets. The memory of the RAF’s inability to defend against the V-2s which rained down on London until their launch sites were overrun in 1944 exerted a heavy influence on Sandys when he became Minister of Defence - much to the detriment of the British aircraft industry. See Dieter Hölsken, V-Missiles Of The Third Reich. The V-1 And V-2 (Sturbridge: Monogram Aviation Publications, 1994).

31. Defence: Outline of Future Policy, Cmnd. 124 (April 1957). In 1957, the USAF announced that “as readily as missiles become operationally suitable, they will be placed into units either to completely or partially substitute for manned aircraft according to military requirements.” G. R. Simonson, “Missiles and Creative Destruction in the American Aircraft Industry, 1956-1961,” in The History of the American Aircraft Industry. An Anthology, ed. G.R. Simonson (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1968), 229, quoting USAF, “The Guided Missile,” The Air Reservist IX (December 1957), 4.

32. Cox, 13. “It is now generally accepted that the Soviet long-range bomber force was maintained as a hedge against failure of the ballistic missile program and that, for both political and strategic reasons, Khrushchev chose to downgrade the role of the bomber, an area where the Soviets were much inferior to the Americans, and to emphasize missile development, in which, at least for negotiating purposes, the Kremlin could claim to be technologically more advanced.” Cox, 13.

33. Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond, and John English, Canada since 1945: Power, Politics, and Provincialism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), 244.

34. Schumpeter's definition of the term was that "the 'creation' of a new and superior product may form the basis for growth and success of the business involved in its production and sale, while at the same time 'destroying' in part or totally those businesses whose products have been surpassed." Simonson, 228, quoting Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 3d ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1950), 84.

35. Dow, 114-115. In 1952, as a Wing Commander, Foottit had headed the All- Weather Interceptor Requirements Team.

36. DHH/DND, CSC, 24-25 October 1957, 3-5. The submission was scheduled to be reviewed one more time at a Special Meeting of the CSC on 29 October 1957. However, as there are no records for this meeting, it may not have taken place. The submission now estimated the overall cost of completing the thirty-seven Arrows to be $646 million. DHH/DND, CSC Report, Appendix A.

37. DHH/DND, CSC, 24-25 October 1957, 4.

38. NAC, CC, 24 October 1957, 4-6; and NAC, CC, 25 October 1957, 2-4.

39. Pearkes also reported to Cabinet that subcontractors would also lay-off additional workers.

40. NAC, CC, 25 October 1957, 2-3.

41. NAC, CC, 24 October 1957, 5.

42. NAC, CC, 24 October 1957, 4.

43. NAC, CC, 29 October 1957, 10-12, with reference to a Memorandum, unsigned, undated, undocumented.

44. As the RCAF had no operational requirement for another twenty Canucks, Cabinet suggested that they be given to a NATO ally. They were not. The non-Arrow related work for Avro and Orenda cost the RCAF $21.55 million over the next two years. At the 25 October 1957 meeting a minister had pointed out “that in some parts of the country an expenditure of $25 million to save the seats of three Members of Parliament and the jobs of 2000-3000 persons would be considered out of all proportion.” NAC, CC, 24 October 1957, 4.

45. NAC, CC, 29 October 1957, 11.

46. Smith, 293.

47. Smith, 309.

48. DHH/DND, CSC Report, Appendix G, Annex I, 1. See also J.L. Granatstein, A Man of Influence. Norman A. Robertson and Canadian Statecraft 1929-1968 (Toronto: Deneau Publishers & Company, Ltd., 1981) 318-320; and Granatstein, “The myth of the broken Arrow;” D2.

49. DHH/DND, CSC Report, Appendix G, Annex I, 1. The North American Aviation F-108 Rapier would be cancelled in September 1959 for much the same reasons as the Arrow programme. For a comparison of the F-108 and the Arrow, see Bill Gunston, Fighters of the Fifties (Cambridge: Patrick Stephens Limited, 1981), 18-21, 178-179. Ironically, the F-108 would help kill the Arrow programme because Pearkes could point to its future role in the defence of North America: “The US had now decided not to proceed with the development of any new interceptor aircraft except for the 108 which was years in the future. This was a long range aircraft of advanced design to be employed from bases in Alaska and Greenland. This US decision would strengthen the government’s position in abandoning the CF-105.” NAC, CC, 22 December 1958, 7.

50. DHH/DND, CSC Report, Appendix G, Annex I, 2.

51. DHH/DND, CSC, 10 June 1958, 6.

52. DHH/DND, series 1, file 10, Air Defence Requirements, 11/30/55-07/29/58, Lieutenant-General H.D. Graham to the Chairman, CSC, CNS, CAS, the Chairman, DRB, and the DM, DND, 4 July 1958.

53. DHH/DND, CSC, 15 July 1958, 1-5. The CSC considered Graham’s letter and formed the ad hoc committee at a Special meeting of the CSC on 8 July 1958. The committee was chaired by a brigadier-general and each service and the DRB appointed two other members of equivalent rank.

54. DHH/DND, Foulkes Papers, 20; and Roy 314-315, 321-322. As Pearkes recalled, “many [RCAF] officers would like to have seen the Arrow developed. On the other hand, there were others who felt as I did...that perhaps we should concentrate more on missiles.” Roy, 321.

55. DHH/DND, Foulkes Papers, 27.

56. DHH/DND, Foulkes Papers, 21.

57. DHH/DND, 73/1233, series 1, file 11, Air Defence Requirements, 31/07/58-30/09/58, Air Marshal Hugh Campbell to Major-General George Pearkes, 21 August 1958, 2. For a summary of the CSC point of view, see DHH/DND, 73/1233, series 1, file 11, Air Defence Requirements, 31/07/58-30/09/58, General Charles Foulkes, “Aide Memoire for the Minister. Advantages and Disadvantages of Continuing Production of the CF-105,” 25 August 1958.

58. NAC, CC, 22 December 1958, 7.

59. NAC, CC, 22 December 1958, 7.

60. NAC, CDC, 15 August 1958, with reference to Minister’s Memorandum, 8 August 1958, Cabinet Document D9-58.

61. NAC, CDC, 15 August 1958, 3.

62. “Force multipliers [such as SAGE] were necessary, as it became obvious that the services were never going to get the kind of forces it would take to thoroughly defend North America, at least not in peacetime. But SAGE allowed American air defenders to maximize what resources were available.” James D. Crabtree, On Air Defense (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1994), 125.

63. The ongoing American disinterest in purchasing the Arrow had once again been confirmed at an August meeting between Pearkes and Neil McElroy, US Secretary of Defence. At that meeting McElroy also urged Canada to adopt BOMARC and SAGE. There is no evidence that Pearkes challenged this advice, which is not surprising as it was identical to that being proffered by the RCAF. NAC, CDC, 15 August 1958, 4, 6; and Smith 310. Pearkes had also met with US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in July, and received much the same response. Roy, 316-317.

64. Smith, 310.

65. DHH/DND, Foulkes Papers, 23.

66. DHH/DND, Foulkes Papers, 23. See also DHH/DND, CSC Report. A lengthy and extremely useful report, its appendices reproduce various letters and memoranda and extracts from Hansard as well as containing summaries of the expenditures on the Arrow programme, of decisions of the CSC, the CDC, and Cabinet, and of discussions with the US and UK regarding the Arrow.

67. NAC, CDC, 21 August 1958, 2-4, with reference to Minister of Defence Production’s Memorandum, 7 August 1958, Cabinet Document D10-58; Secretary of State for External Affairs’ Memorandum, 14 August 1958, Cabinet Document D11-58; and Minister of Finance’s Memorandum, 13 August 1958, Cabinet Document D12-58.

68. DHH/DND, 73/1233, series 1, file 11, Air Defence Requirements, 31/07/58- 30/09/58, Lieutenant-General H. D. Graham, Chief of the General Staff to Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, 21 August 1958.

69. NAC, CDC, 21 August 1958, 4.

70. NAC, CC, 28 August 1958, 6-11, with reference to Minister’s Memorandum, 22 August 1958, Cabinet Document 247-58; 3 September 1958, 2-5; 7 September 1958, 16-18; 8 September 1958, 6-7; 21 September 1958, 9-12; and 22 September 1958, 2-3.

71. All would be cost-shared on the same basis as previous joint projects, on a one- third Canadian, two-thirds US basis. The BOMARC bases were built in North Bay, Ontario, and La Macaza, Quebec. For a representative sample of the literature on the BOMARC see Robert H. Clark, “Canadian Weapons Acquisition: A Case Study Of The BOMARC Missile,” (MA thesis, Royal Military College, 1983); DHH/DND, Foulkes Papers; McLin; and Munton.

72. NAC, CC, 28 August 1958, 9.

73. NAC, CC, 7 September 1958, 17.

74. NAC, CC, 3 September 1958, 3. There were series of meetings between Avro and Orenda management and ministersin September 1958. At one meeting Fleming was asked "whether or not the Government would be interested in a $350,000,000 reduction in the program's cost of 100 aircraft [if Astra and Sparrow II were cancelled]...Mr. Fleming replied that he would be interested in a reduction of 350 cents." Smye, 80.

75. DHH/DND, Foulkes Papers, 25.

76. NAC, CC, 28 August 1958, 11.

77. NAC, CC, 3 September 1958, 4.

78. NAC, CC, 21 September 1958, 12. The CSC would continue to meet and prepare submissions and reports on the issue of an alternative to the Arrow throughout the rest of 1958 and 1959, but from this point on it operated on the assumption that the Arrow programme was finished. Richter, 31-34.

79. Diefenbaker’s statement is also reproduced in McLin, 225-228.

80. Fleming, The Rising Years, 416. Apparently, Avro and Orenda management were informed by John Pallett, the local MP for Peel and the Conservative Whip, that unemployment was sole the reason behind the deferral. Campagna, Storms Of Controversy, 120.

81. Donald M. Fleming, So Very Near. The Political Memoirs Of The Honourable Donald M. Fleming. The Summit Years. Volume Two (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1985), 9-10.

82. Frost wrote repeatedly to Diefenbaker on the issue. He would later conclude that “the decision to terminate...was completely sound but its execution was really indescribable,” adding that “it was the beginning of the decline of the Diefenbaker government. The method adopted completely lost the confidence of business and industry....In a space of ten months, the overwhelming vote of confidence of March 1958 was completely lost. Roger Graham, Old Man Ontario: Leslie H. Frost (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 357-358, quoting Premier Leslie Frost. Fleming would later report to Cabinet that Frost had spoken to him in “pungent language” about the decision to stop the Arrow programme. NAC, CC,
17 February 1959, 5.

83. Blair Fraser, “What led Canada to junk the Arrow,” Maclean’s, 25 October 1958, 2. See also Blair Fraser, “Our Airborne Maginot Line.” Maclean’s, 8 November 1958, 18- 19, 87-88, 90.

84. Fraser, “What led Canada to junk the Arrow,” 2.? Fraser, “What led Canada to junk the Arrow,” 2.

85. Crawford Gordon, Jr., “We should and will go on building Arrows,” Maclean’s, 20 December 1958, 8, 54-55. For the argument in favour of interceptors in general see John Gellner “The defence of Canada,” Canadian Commentator, December 1958, 12; and John Gellner, “Musing over the Debris,” Canadian Commentator, March 1959, 3. Gellner was a retired RCAF Wing Commander and a prominent defence commentator. See Bercuson and Granatstein. For the argument against interceptors see Eayrs,“Back to the Drafting Board; “Defending the Realm: (1);” and “Defending the Realm: (2).”

86. Michael Bliss, Northern Enterprise. Five Centuries of Canadian Business (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1987), 475.

87. John Porter, The Vertical Mosaic. An Analysis Of Social Class And Power In Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), 259-263, 550-552; and Dow, vii-viii.

88. NAC, CC, 22 December 1958, 7. On 15 December 1958, a meeting of the newly created Canada-US Ministerial Committee on Joint Defence was convened in Paris. During the meeting Secretary of State Dulles and Secretary of the Treasury Robert Anderson once again stated that the US had no interest in purchasing the Arrow. Roy, 320; and Fleming, The Summit Years, 14. Fleming also claims that one or two unnamed NATO allies offered to accept the Arrow as a gift, “but we were not prepared to play Santa Claus with such costly presents.” Fleming. The Summit Years, 14.

89. James Eayrs, “Canadian Defence Polices Since 1867,” Special Studies Prepared For The Special Committee Of The House Of Commons On Matters Relating To Defence, Supplement 1964-1965, 20.

90. ? McLin, 70. “At one stage [the British Aircraft Corporation] proposed an [air-to- air] equipped version of the TSR-2 for [Canada], to serve as a long-range interceptor after Canada’s own CF-105 Arrow was cancelled.” Bill Gunston, “Beyond The Frontiers. BAC TSR-2,” Wings of Fame. The Journal Of Classic Combat Aircraft 4 (1996): 131. This statement should indicate the level of desperation which existed in the TSR-2 programme at the time. The TSR-2 is to Britain what the Arrow is to Canada, and the project unfolded in a manner strangely analogous to that of the Arrow. For a representative sample of the literature on the TSR-2 see also Frank Barnett-Jones, “Concept versus Reality. A detailed assessment of the TSR-2,”Aeroplane Monthly 25, no. 7, and 25, no. 8 (July 1997 and August 1997): 56-61 and 64-71; Charles Gardner, British Aircraft Corporation. A History (London: B.T. Batsford Ltd., 1981); Bill Gunston, Attack Aircraft of the West (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1974); Stephen Hastings, The Murder of TSR2 (London: Macdonald & Co. (Publishers), Ltd., 1966); John Law, “The Anatomy of a Socio-Technical Struggle: The Design of the TSR-2,” in Technology And Social Process, ed. Brian Elliot (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1988), 44-69; John Law and Michel Callon, “Engineering and Sociology in a Military Aircraft Project: A Network Analysis of Technological Change,” Social Problems 35, no. 3 (June 1988): 284-297; Geoffrey Williams, Frank Gregory, and John Simpson, Crisis In Procurement: A Case Study Of The TSR-2 (London: Royal United Service Institution, 1969); Geoffrey Williams, “The Strategy of the TSR-2,” International Journal XXV, no. 4 (Autumn 1970): 726-744; and Derek Wood, Project Cancelled. A searching criticism of the abandonment of Britain’s advanced aircraft projects (London: Macdonald and Jane’s, 1975). For a recent weapons acquisition process analogous to the Arrow programme, see Dov S. Zakheim, Flight Of The Lavi. Inside a U.S.-Israeli Crisis (Washington: Brassey’s, Inc., 1996) and Galen Roger Perras, “Israel and the Lavi Fighter-Aircraft: The Lion Falls To Earth,” in The Defence Industrial Base And The West, ed. David G. Haglund (New York: Routledge, 1989), 189-233.

91. Granatstein, Canada 1957-1967, 107. “The lesson for Canada, as for other countries, is plain: the key to effective participation in the aerospace enterprise is collaboration on an international level. And, ideally, such collaboration should involve Canadian firms over the whole cycle of research, development, manufacturing, and worldwide marketing for a component or range of products.” Lukasiewicz, 257.

92. Halpenny Committee, No.4 (18 May 1960), 98.

93. Halpenny Committee, No. 5 (20 May 1960), 135.

94. H. Basil Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World: A Populist in Foreign Affairs (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), 85. Robinson was the DEA’s representative in the Prime Minister’s Office, and he may have been the only DEA official that Diefenbaker trusted.

95. Diefenbaker, 36.

96. NAC, CC, 28 January 1959, 6. Pearkes had earlier been instructed to assume the Arrow programme would be cancelled when making up his main estimates for 1959-1960. NAC, CC, 25 November 1958, 7.

97. NAC, CC, 3 February 1959, 4-5.

98. NAC, CDC, 5 February 1959, 2-5, with reference to a Minister’s Memorandum, 30 January 1959, unreferenced.

99. NAC, CDC, 5 February 1959, 3.

100. NAC, CDC, 5 February 1959, 4. In the course of the discussion it was also suggested that consideration be given to increasing the number of BOMARC bases in Canada by moving two or more of the American chain north of the border in the Western, Atlantic, and Pacific regions. The idea was not pursued.

101. NAC, CDC, 5 February 1959, 4.

102. NAC, CDC, 5 February 1959, 2. These figures are in part based upon an offer from Avro to enter into a fixed price contract for 100 Arrows complete with Iroquois engines and the MA-1 electronics system for $3,750,000, not including development costs. The range of the Arrow had also been increased, its deployment date moved forward, and Avro estimated that only twenty of the thirty-seven preproduction aircraft were needed for evaluation and testing. DHH/DND, 73/1233, series 1, file 12, Air Defence Requirements, 10/28/58-11/09/59, Fred T. Smye to The Hon. George R. Pearkes, VC, 21 October 1958. Smye also claims in his memoirs that at a meeting between Avro management and US officials the Americans offered to make a gift of the MA-1 electronics system and the Falcon missile to Canada, which would have further reduced project costs. Smye, 88. Though there is no reason to doubt that this occurred, there is no record of any high-level discussion of the offer, and undoubtedly such a gift would have been viewed as a form of military aid and, therefore, would have been rejected as politically unacceptable.

103. NAC, CDC, 5 February 1959, 4.

104. Fleming, The Summit Years,12.

105. NAC, CC, 13 January 1959, 8-9; 28 January 1959, 6; 3 February 1959, 4-5; 4 February 1959, 3-4, with reference to Minister’s Memorandum, 30 January 1959, unreferenced; 10 February 1959, 2-3, with reference to Minister’s Memorandum, 6 February 1959, Cabinet Document 46-59 ; 14 February 1959, 3-5; 17 February 1959, 4-5; 19 February 1959, 2; and 23 February 1959, 2-4.

106. J.L. Granatstein, The Ottawa Men. The Civil Service Mandarins 1935-1957 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1982), 270.

107. R.B. Bryce, Ottawa, Ontario, to Russell Isinger, LS, 17 August 1991, 1. Bryce, once a strong supporter of the Arrow programme, by September 1958 had come to the same conclusions as the CSC and the MND - that the cost of the project outweighed the benefits However, his advice that the government announce that an alternative American interceptor would be procured instead of the Arrow was not taken. See Diefenbaker Canada Centre, John G. Diefenbaker Papers, MG01 (hereinafter Diefenbaker Papers), VI, PMO Numbered Series, 1957-1963, vol. 55, file 171, Arrow Conf., Defence Expenditures - Aircraft - Arrow - Confidential, 1958, 1960, R.B. Bryce, “Memorandum For The Prime Minister. Re: The 105 Problem,” 5 September 1958.

108. NAC, CC, 10 February 1959, 2. One member of Cabinet worried that if Canada spent $500,000,000 to reequip the RCAF Air Division in Europe but allowed USAF squadrons to defend Canada, it would create an inexplicable situation where “in effect, Canada would be defending Europe, and the US would be defending Canada.” NAC, CC, 10 February 1959, 3.

109. NAC, CC, 14 February 1959, 3.

110. NAC, CC, 23 February 1959, 4. In contrast, James Eayrs wrote that “in fact, we are less dependent on the United States without the Arrow than with it. Having liberated a major fortune from a useless undertaking, we may now devote resources to projects strengthening our powers of independent decision.” Eayrs, Northern Approaches, 28.

111. NAC, CC, 14 February 1959, 4. There were, however, dissenters amongst Diefenbaker’s officials. Dr. Merrill Menzies, an economic advisor in the Prime Minister’s Office, argued against the cancellation, believing that the cancellation was “sold to the government without adequate consideration of the economic and political implications....This was bad enough, but if that had been all, one could have possibly accepted it, but reluctantly. However, tied to that was the related BOMARC decision, which ironically by a chain of events led to the final break-up of the government...What really happened economically from that decision was again - even if localized - massive unemployment, and of very highly skilled people. We destroyed a whole industry. It was one of the major reasons for the total disaffection of the Toronto area which showed up, obviously, at the next election.” Peter Stursberg, Diefenbaker: Leadership Gained 1956-1962. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975, 119.

112. Diefenbaker’s statement is reproduced in McLin, 229-239; and House of Commons, Debates, 20 February 1959.

113. Diefenbaker, 41. Several thousand workers were quietly called back to work in the following weeks. Harry McDougall, "Black Friday: Five Years Later," Saturday Night, March 1964, 14. At Cabinet meetings on 26 and 27 February 1959, Cabinet agreed to meet the payroll for a nucleus of technicians and engineers for a six-month period, with the costs shared equally between the government and Avro and Orenda. Government liability was limited to $1,650,000. NAC, CC, 26 February 1959, 5-6, and 27 February 1959, 2-4. Cabinet, however, was less than impressed with Avro and Orenda’s handling of their business affairs, noting also that “Avro had warned the government several months ago that it would be in difficulties in the not too distant future, notwithstanding the Arrow contract.” NAC, CC, 27 February 1959, 3. See also Diefenbaker Papers, VI, PMO Numbered Series, 1957-1963, file 162, Defence Production - Defence Orders, 1958-1961, A.V. Roe Canada Limited, “Economic Position Of Avro Aircraft Limited And Orenda Engines Limited,” 31 July 1958.

114. A confrontational meeting did occur in the Prime Minister’s Office between a possibly intoxicated and certainly bellicose Gordon and Diefenbaker in the wake of the announcement. In response to Gordon’s corporate complaints, Diefenbaker reportedly slammed his fist onto his desk and said “My shareholders are eighteen million Canadians.” Thomas Van Dusen, The Chief (Toronto: The McGraw-Hill Company of Canada Limited, 1968), 92. After this meeting Avro management “sought to keep Gordon out of the capital for fear he would only further antagonize the Prime Minister.” Brown, “The Road to the Arrow,” 155, quoting Air Marshal Wilfrid Curtis.

115. NAC, CC, 23 February 1959, 2-3.

116. For representative sample of the debate surrounding the cancellation see House of Commons, Debates, 23 February1959 (Labour Crisis in the Aircraft Industry); 2 March 1959 (Defence Policy, Planning, and Production); 3 March 1959 (Defence Policy, Planning, and Production); 2 July 1959 (Supply - National Defence); and 8 July 1959 (Supply - Defence Production). See also the debates of the Senate and of the Ontario legislature for 23 February 1959 and thereafter.

117. Hellyer, 19. Foulkes characterized Hellyer’s statements as sarcastic, caustic, inaccurate, and filled with “exaggerated and irresponsible charges.” DHH/DND, Foulkes Papers, 28.

118. NAC, Howe Papers, vol. 109, file 75-7, Political - General, Mike Pearson to C.D. Howe, 21 January 1959.

119. NAC, Howe Papers, vol. 149, file 75-7 Political - General, C.D. Howe to Mike Pearson, 22 January 1959. In a subsequent letter Howe went even further: “Confidentially, I think the Arrow contract had to be cancelled. Costs have been completely out of hand, and there is a two or three year delay in the completion date. The method of cancellation however is completely cock-eyed. The company should have been given a definite notice six months in advance to plan for an orderly reduction in staff. This may well have been Crawford Gordon’s fault.” NAC, Howe Papers, vol. 149, file 75-7 Political - General, C.D. Howe to Senator W.A. Fraser, 29 February 1959.

120. Lester B. Pearson, Mike. The Memoirs Of The Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, PC, CC, OM, OBE, MA, LLD. Volume 3. 1957-1968, ed. John A. Munro and Alex I. Ingalls (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), 47. Pearson also noted “There was even an apparent vindictiveness in the decision to scrap the five completed planes and the others half completed so that no museum of science and technology would ever be able toshow what we could design and produce. It was on this irrational element in the decision that we centred our attack, thus reflecting the feelings of most Canadians.” Pearson, 47-48. See also John English, The Worldly Years. The Life Of Lester Pearson. Volume II: 1949-1972 (Toronto: Vintage Books Canada, 1993).

121. Stewart, 269-272.

122. Stursberg, 122.

123. Smith, 326.

124. DHH/DND, Foulkes Papers, 18.

125. McLin, 84. Foulkes reportedly referred to Diefenbaker’s February statement as
a “masterpiece of subterfuge.” Smye, 2.

126. Slemon even took the step of outlining the RCAF’s bitterness over the government’s inaction in a letter to his American superior, although he recognized that the cancellation of the Arrow programme left the government with “a major political headache.” DHH/DND, series 1, file 13, Air Defence Requirements, 12/03/59-05/01/60, Air Marshal C.R. Slemon, Deputy Commander-in-Chief, to Commander-in-Chief, NORAD, 28 January 1960.

127. NAC, CC, 6 February 1960, 2. The Voodoo procurement was discussed over the course of several CSC, CDC, and Cabinet meetings. The CCs do not support Diefenbaker’s statement that he had been opposed the cancellation, and he should not be taken seriously. However, there is little doubt that Diefenbaker “always felt that we had been jockeyed into the position of cancelling the Avro Arrow by the military...and some other senior advisers of the government.” Roy, 324, quoting E. Davie Fulton, Minister of Justice in the Conservative government.

128. The US initially offered to give the Voodoos to Canada, but this was rejected as a form of military aid. In the end they were traded to Canada as part of a complex exchange of defence responsibilities and orders. It is ironic that this is a similar arrangement to that proposed by the Americans in 1958 with regard to the Arrow. McLin, 100-105. Diefenbaker would later refuse to negotiate with the US to accept nuclear warheads for the weapons Canada had purchased after the cancellation of the Arrow programme, thereby spending hundreds of millions of dollars “for the most impressive collection of blank cartridges in the history of military science.” Newman, 354. See also Granatstein, Canada 1957-1967; and Lawrence Martin, The Presidents & The Prime Ministers. Washington and Ottawa Face to Face: The Myth of Bilateral Bliss 1867-1982 (Toronto: PaperJacks Ltd., 1982).

129. See David L. Bashow, Starfighter. A loving retrospective of the CF-104 era in Canadian fighter aviation 1961-1986 (Stoney Creek: Fortress Publications Inc., 1991); Milberry, Sixty Years; and Molson and Taylor.

130. NAC, CC, 14 August 1959, 4-6. The Starfighter procurement had previously been discussed at several CSC, CDC, and Cabinet meetings.

131. NAC, CC, 14 August 1959, 4.

132. NAC, CC, 14 August 1959, 5.

133. NAC, CC, 14 August 1959, 5.

134. DHH/DND, Foulkes Papers, 19;Diefenbaker, 40; and Smith, 313. Foulkes later wrote that Diefenbaker “suspected the military, particularly the Air Force, of leaking information to the Company and of urging them to exert pressure on the Government.... There were perhaps some grounds for the Government’s suspicion, as there had to be a close liaison between the airforce and the operating branches of the company.” DHH/DND, Foulkes Papers, 19.

135. Roy, 318.

136. Newman, 348.

137. Smye, 83. Fleming later wrote that management at Avro and Orenda informed the government that they wanted to be looked upon as “the government’s arsenal.” Fleming, The Summit Years, 11.

138. Diefenbaker, 38.

139. Bliss, Northern Enterprise, 475-476.

140. Lukasiewicz, 253.

141. Diefenbaker, 34.

142. “The Avro Nettle Patch,” The Economist, 28 February 1959, 790. See also“Dilemma for Canada’s Defence Industry, The Economist, 11 April 1959, 136, 139. Though the author of these two pieces is simply identified as “Our Ottawa Correspondent,” there is evidence to suggest that the author was Norman Robertson, Canadian Ambassador to the US and a former Undersecretary of State for External Affairs. Campagna, Storms Of Controversy, 152.

143. McDougall, 13-15. “The Canadian government unintentionally gave the American space program its luckiest break....The Canadians never gained much public recognition for their contribution to the manned space program, but to the people within the program their contribution was incalculable....They had it all over us, in many areas...just brilliant guys....They were more mature and they were bright as hell and talented and professional, to a man.” Campagna, Storms Of Controversy, 195, quoting Charles Murray and Catherine Bly-Cox, Apollo: The Race to the Moon (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969).

144. Minifie, 153, quoting Professor Norman Mackenzie.

145. Shaw, “The Influence of Post-War Continental Air-Defence Strategies and National Economic Development Policies on the Industrial Organization of the Canadian Aerospace Industry,” 84.

146. Orenda became a division of Hawker-Siddeley Canada.

147. Dan Middlemiss, “The Road From Hyde Park: Canada-US Defense Economic Cooperation,” in Fifty Years Of Canada-United States Defense Cooperation. The Road From Ogdensburg, ed. Joel J. Sokolsky and Joseph T. Jockel (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellon Press, 1992), 184.

148. C.P. Stacey, “Twenty-one years of Canadian-American Military Co-operation, 1940-1961,” in Canada-United States Treaty Relationships, Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Centre Publication Number 19, ed. David R. Deener (Durham: Duke University Press, 1963), 116.

149. Conant, “Canada and Continental Defence,” 226.

150. The academic literature on Canada-US cooperation in the area of defence production during this period is vast. For a representative sample see Byers, “Canadian Defence and Defence Procurement;” Conant, “Canada and Continental Defence;” Conant, The Long Polar Watch; Crane; Alistair Edgar and David Haglund, The Canadian Defence Industry in the New Global Environment (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1995); John Gellner, “The Place Of Defence In The Economic Life of Canada,” in The Canadian Military. A Profile, ed. Hector J. Massey (Toronto: The Copp Clark Publishing Company, 1972), 119-137; John J. Kirton, “The Consequences of Integration: The Case Of The Defence Production Sharing Agreements,” in Continental Community? Independence and Integration in North America, ed. W. Andrew Axline, James E. Hyndman, Peyton V. Lyon, and Maureen A. Molot (Toronto: McLelland and Stewart Limited, 1974), 116-136; McLin; Middlemiss and Sokolsky; Dan Middlemiss, “Canada And Defence Industrial Preparedness: A Return To Basics?,” International Journal XLII, no.4 (Autumn 1987): 707-730, also in Canada’s Defence. Perspectives On Policy In The Twentieth Century, ed. B.D. Hunt and R.G. Haycock (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1993), 242-257; Dan Middlemiss, “Defence Procurement In Canada,” in Canada’s International Security Policy, ed. David B. Dewitt and David Leyton-Brown (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc.,1995), 391-412; Middlemiss, “Economic Defence Co-operation with the United States 1940-1963; Middlemiss, “A Pattern of Cooperation: The Case of the Canadian-American Defence Production and Development Sharing Agreements, 1958-1963;” Morton, A Military History Of Canada; Morton, Canada and War; Shaw, “The Influence of Post-War Continental Air-Defence Strategies and National Economic Development Policies on the Industrial Organization of the Canadian Aerospace Industry;” Stacey; Robert Van Steenburg, “An Analysis Of Canadian-American Defence Economic Cooperation: The History And Current Issues,” in Canada’s Defence Industrial Base: The Political Economy of Preparedness and Procurement, ed. David G. Haglund (Kingston: R.P. Frye, 1988),189-219; Warnock; and Willoughby.

151. Bothwell, 117-118. “It was in this way [the DPSA] that the Diefenbaker government defended Canada against the horrors of continentalism.” Bothwell, Drummond, and English, 244.

152. Diefenbaker always stated that “I had no knowledge whatsoever of this action.” Diefenbaker, 42. The evidence supports this claim as the orders to scrap the existing Arrows were issued after correspondence between Pearkes, Campbell, Miller, and David Golden, DM, DDP (1954-1962). See Campagna, Storms Of Controversy; and the memoranda in NAC, DND, acc.83-84/167, box 6428, file S1038-CN-180, CF-105 Arrow Aircraft - General, 1952-1962, pt.26; and DHH/DND, file 79/333, NDHQ, DHIST, March 13, 1959 - January 11, 1980, Eyes Only - Director, DHIST, re. responsibility for scrapping Arrow prototypes. There was an additional reason why DDP was assigned the task: “Declaring as surplus material to Crown Assets Disposal agency. This course is not recommended for the reason that this agency has the prerogative of selling this material in its original state. This course could lead to subsequent embarrassment, that is, airframe and engine could conceivably be placed on public view or even, in fact, used as a roadside stand. This, I am sure, you will agree is most undesirable.” DHH/DND, file 79/333, NDHQ, DHIST, March 13, 1959 - January 11, 1980, Eyes Only - Director, DHIST, re. responsibility for scrapping Arrow prototypes, Air Marshal Hugh Campbell, Chief of the Air Staff, “Memorandum. The Minister (Through The Deputy Minister). Arrow Cancellation - Disposal of Material,” 26 March 1959.

Chapter Four:

1. Bliss, “Canada’s Swell War,” 64.

2. John Keegan, The Battle For History. Re-Fighting World War Two (Toronto: Vintage Books, 1995), 30.

3. Donald C. Story, “Canadian Defence Policy: The Case Of The Avro Arrow,” (MA paper, University of Toronto, 1970), 35.

4. Nicholson, 318.

5. Floyd, “The Avro Story,” 130.

6. Bliss, Northern Enterprise, 477.

7. DHH/DND, Foulkes Papers, 39.

8. John W. Holmes, The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the search for world order, 1943-1957, vol. 2 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983), 284.

9. Thomas A. Hockin, “Three Canadian Prime Ministers Discuss The Office,” in Apex Of Power. The Prime Minister and Political Leadership in Canada, 2d ed., ed. Thomas A. Hockin (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall of Canada, Ltd., 1977), 249-250. About the opposition, Diefenbaker went on to say that “Naturally, the attack on the decision was concentrated in the area particularly affected.” Hockin, 250.

10. Richard Gwyn, 49th Paradox. Canada in North America. (Toronto: McLelland and Stewart Limited, 1985), 110.

11. Middlemiss, “Defence Procurement In Canada,” 394.

12. Granatstein, Canada 1957-1967, 109.

13. Morton, A Military History Of Canada, 243.

14. Morton, Canada and War, 181. “Within the Department of National Defence, the RCAF had suffered the most humiliation.” Morton, Canada and War, 181.

15. Porter, 551.

16. R.B. Byers, Canadian Security and Defence: The Legacy and the Challenges, Adelphi Papers No. 214 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1986), 5; and Van Steenburg, 196. Byers further added that “in effect, the concept of “security policy” has been alien to Canada’s approach to international affairs [even though] Canada’s security interests would be better served if this situation were rectified.” Byers, Canadian Security and Defence, 5.

17. Alistair and Edgar, 45. “Hypothetically - in Augustine’s perhaps not entirely facetious example - the result of constantly rising unit costs, measured against defence procurement budgets that increase more modestly or even decline, could be that by the year 2054 (based on 1980 budget projections) the entire US defence budget would allow the purchase of just one tactical aircraft. For other NATO countries, however, the impact of such trends ceased to be a laughing matter long ago.” Edgar and Haglund, 45, quoting Thomas A. Callaghan, Jr., Pooling Allied and American Resources to Produce a Credible, Collective Conventional Deterrent (Washington: United States Department of Defence, 1988), 23, 31-32.

18. With the exception of ships for the RCN. Edgar and Haglund, 45.

19. Whitaker and Marcuse, 155.

20. McLin, 63.

21. Clark, 45.

22. Middlemiss, “Defence Procurement In Canada,” 395.

23. Sutherland, 199.

24. Eayrs, Northern Approaches, 24.

25. “The Avro Nettle Patch,” 790.

26. Cox, 6.

27. The preceding two paragraphs are in part a paraphrasing of Brown’s own conclusion about the US strategic bomber programme. Brown, Flying Blind, x, 14, 312-313.

28. Byers, Canadian Security and Defence, 2, quoting C.R. Nixon, a DM, DND, during Liberal Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s years in government.

29. Bland, The Administration Of Defence Policy In Canada, 153, quoting D.G. Loomis, “Managing the Defence Services Program,” Canadian Defence Quarterly no.7 (Spring 1978): 79-80.

30. And Canada certainly was not unique in its experience with the Arrow programme: middle powers like Argentina, Egypt, Israel, India, Switzerland et al cancelled similar projects. Sweden represents a notable exception, but of course Sweden’s neutralist foreign policy imperative is considerably different that of Canada. Lukasiewicz, 255-256. See also Michael K. Hawes, “The Swedish Defence Industrial Base: Implications for the Economy,” in The Defence Industrial Base And The West, ed. David G. Haglund (New York: Routledge, 1989), 163-188.

31. Middlemiss, “Defence Procurement In Canada,” 400.

32. Manson, 10. Manson would go on to become commander of Air Command (1983-1985) and Chief of the Defence Staff (1986-1989). After his retirement from the Canadian Armed Forces, he became president of the Montreal-based Paramax Systems Limited. Manson would himself become a victim of a cancelled programme when, in 1993, the Liberal government of Prime Minister Jean Chretien cancelled the European Helicopter Industries Limited EH-101 programme on which Paramax was the prime contractor. See Bercuson and Granatstein.

33. Eayrs, Peacemaking And Deterrence, 123.

Appendix I:

1. Diefenbaker Papers, VI, PMO Numbered Series, 1957-1963, vol. 55, file 171, Defence Expenditures - Aircraft 1958-1962, “Office Of The Prime Minister. Press Release. Revision Of The Canadian Air Defence Programme,” 23 September 1958.

Appendix II:

1. Diefenbaker Papers, XXI, Speech Series, 1920-1979, vol. 27, file 751s, “Statement On Defence By The Prime Minister The Rt. Hon. John G. Diefenbaker In The House Of Commons,” 20 February 1959.

© Copyright Russell Steven Paul Isinger, 1997. All rights reserved.

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